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Abstract 
To put public debt on a sustainable path, many governments face the task of 
enacting large fiscal consolidation followed by years of sustained primary 
surpluses. By estimating hazard functions for the duration of consolidations, we 
analyse the features of past consolidation efforts across a panel of advanced 
economies. Our contribution is to identify the factors that help to start and sustain 
consolidations, separately discussing governments’ “commitment” to the cause as 
well as their “capacity” for action. Our analysis suggests that longer consolidations 
are initiated when public debt is high, fiscal deficits are large, the interest burden 
heavy and long-term sovereign bond yields elevated. However, we also find that a 
countries’ “capacity” to change course is important. Higher initial private sector 
savings, a stronger external balance, a competitive position and stable financial 
conditions appear to provide more scope for governments to sustain longer-lasting 
consolidations. Once we have controlled for the initial macroeconomic conditions, 
there is a lesser role for governments’ commitment as reflected in factors such as 
the composition and the pace of the fiscal adjustment or the political cycle in 
explaining the duration of consolidation. However, commitment to permanent, 
rather than temporary, fiscal adjustment is key.  
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Introduction 
One legacy of the recent financial and economic crisis has been a substantial fiscal 
burden for most developed countries. Heavy financial sector support, deep 
economic contraction, and counter-cyclical fiscal policies have all sharply raised 
government debt-to-GDP ratios since 2008. The legacy effects are potentially 
severe: increased government borrowing is likely to raise governments’ financing 
costs, impact on private financing conditions, crowd-out private investment and 
lower potential economic growth (Hartwig Lojsch, Rodríguez-Vives and Slavik, 
2011). Restoring fiscal sustainability is thus a top policy priority across much of the 
developed world. To ensure that government debt is on a sustainable path many 
governments inside and outside the euro area must enact large fiscal consolidation 
and then sustain substantial primary budget surpluses for many years. That is 
especially true for the euro area countries currently under EU/IMF programmes, 
where countries commit to rein in deficits and reform their economies.  
The challenge is big but not unknown. Several analyses, from the ECB and other 
international institutions, have highlighted the past experience of countries that 
managed to sustain fiscal consolidations and/or large primary budget surpluses 
over some years (ECB, 2011). However, to understand properly the relevance of 
fiscal adjustment processes of the past, we need to analyse how different factors 
supporting the length of periods of government action to improve their fiscal 
balances. In this vein, there is a rich stream of empirical papers that have tried to 
understand the possible factors supporting “successful” fiscal consolidations. The 
academic literature systematically refers to the expression “success” and provides 
a number of definitions to it. However, the term “successful” is controversial. The 
aims and effects of a period of consolidation would be perceived differently by 
different actors which may have conflicting preferences about choices for achieving 
fiscal sustainability.1 While one stream of the literature defines “success” as the 
ability to significantly reduce government debt over the consolidation period (e.g. 
Heylen and Everaert, 2000), our work, in line with another stream of existing 
studies, measures the persistence (length or longevity) of the fiscal consolidation 
effort over time. 
In this article, we draw from the literature that analyses the factors affecting the 
length of consolidations, using duration analysis to estimating hazard functions 
(e.g. von Hagen, Hughes, and Strauch (2002); Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and 
Mulas-Granados (2004); Maroto Illera and Mulas-Granados (2008); Agnello, 
Castro and Sousa (2012)). The bulk of previous empirical research on the 
determinants affecting consolidation makes use of case studies, descriptive 
statistics and econometric techniques – mainly regressions with “successful” fiscal 
consolidations as dummy variable (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna (1998); Guichard, 
Kennedy, Wurzel and Andre (2007)).2 The results of existing research differ, not 
only because of methodological differences, but also due to the different definitions 
of “success”. The benefit of duration analysis for our purpose is that, as Gupta et 
al. (2004) argue, it enables us to treat the duration of fiscal consolidation as 
endogenous. In contrast to empirical studies which use a descriptive approach to 
assess the determinants of past adjustment episodes, duration analysis makes use 
                                                                                                         
1 Moreover, another interesting angle to explore would be whether policy makers with their choices in 
the fiscal consolidation mix are successful in limiting the pressure exerted by organized interest groups 
towards increasing quasi-private expenditure, such as the recipients of current and capital grants (e.g. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962)), or in reducing the perception of fiscal illusion (Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977)). 
2 Other approaches to overcome shortcomings of regression analysis, include the use of model 
averaging techniques by Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011) which implies considering and 
estimating all the possible regressions and subsequently construct a weighted average as the estimate 
of the variables (determinant of consolidations). 
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of all the information available in the data.3 The distinction is important: to 
understand what helps sustain a long-lasting consolidation effort, we also need to 
analyse the failures, those that stopped after only a short period of time. In doing 
so, we aim at addressing one of the major challenges facing several euro area 
countries: how likely is it that a government will be able to enact large fiscal 
consolidations over a number of years? And what factors are likely to support their 
efforts? No doubt it has been a key question posed by capital markets as 
sovereign bond spreads have widened since the onset of financial crisis in 2007. 
But this is just one approach to analysing past experiences with fiscal consolidation 
and it has quite a narrow focus: it asks how long governments have managed to 
sustain uninterrupted periods of consolidation in the past and what factors affected 
their ability to do so? It does not directly comment either on debt sustainability, the 
success of fiscal consolidation in achieving a lasting reduction in government debt 
ratios nor does it deal with the consequences of consolidation – either for growth or 
welfare.  
Candidate factors sustaining the length of fiscal 
consolidations  
Our contribution is to provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of 
candidate determinants of duration of fiscal consolidation applied to 20 advanced 
economies between 1970 and 2010. We group the potential main factors – mostly 
justified by the literature as likely to sustaining consolidations – into three types of 
variables (see overview Table 1). First, we refer to the “push factors”, which act as 
circumstances where adjustment is likely to start. Lengthy consolidations are 
frequently ‘forced’ upon governments when fiscal deficits and government debt are 
large, but also when the interest burden is heavy and long-term sovereign bond 
yields are elevated. Second, once consolidation has started we identify the “pull” 
factors that sustain the adjustment over time. We separate these variables into two 
sets: governments’ “capacity” for action, or in other words, a wide range of 
macroeconomic conditions that might enable and facilitate lengthy fiscal 
consolidation; and governments’ “commitment”, or the fiscal policy and political 
factors that might support governments’ willingness to pursue painful 
consolidations. Other papers have already analysed, mostly using regressions but 
also duration analyses,4 simultaneously several factors sustaining consolidation in 
a comprehensive way. However, as explained in the remainder of this section, the 
emphasis has been largely on the fiscal policy and political factors that affect 
consolidations. Papers that also consider the macroeconomic conditions are 
typically limited to analysing the evolution of the growth rate of GDP or output gap. 
Some studies have extended the analysis of economic conditions to other 
variables – competitiveness, the international economic environment, or monetary 
conditions – but there has been a clear gap in empirical research on the role of 
financial or private sector balance sheets in sustaining fiscal consolidations. 
                                                                                                         
3  The survival analysis comes originally from medical research, but it started to be applied in socio-
economic research in the 1970s and 1980s to plausibly model the behaviour of complex issues– also 
denominated duration analysis. For instance, in labour economics, empirical questions about 
employment can be specified in the language of hazard functions such as the longer a job is held, the 
less likely it is to be lost (Kiefer, 1988) or, in housing markets to analyse the duration of house price 
upturns and downturns (Bracke, 2011).  
4 Although duration analysis techniques have already been applied to study the persistence of fiscal 
consolidations, some related studies apply different sample period and countries (e.g. EU-15 countries 
during 1960-2004 by Maroto Illera and Mulas-Granados (2008); or 25 emerging countries during 1980-
2001 by Gupta et. al (2004)). 
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Table 1: Candidate determinants explaining the length of fiscal consolidation 
episodes 
 Variables Indicators 
Budget balance position  Initial primary budget balance 
Government indebtedness  Initial stock government debt-to-GDP ratio  
P
U
S
H
 
FA
C
TO
R
S
 
P
re
-c
on
di
tio
ns
 
Cost of financing  
Government interest payments  
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term bond yields  
Growth  GDP  
Monetary conditions  Inflation rate  Interest rate 
External positions Current account balance 
International economic conditions World GDP  
Competitiveness Real exchange rate Unit labour cost 
Private sector balance sheets 
Stock of private debt  
Private sector saving 
Private sector net lending 
C
ap
ac
ity
 
Financial conditions and financial 
imbalances 
Asset price developments 
Credit growth 
Financial crisis dummy variable 
Composition of consolidation  Consolidation on the revenue side versus consolidation on the expenditure side 
Pace of adjustment Size of the adjustment effort Degree of frontloading  
Fiscal rules 
Expenditure rules 
Budget balance rules 
Strength of the fiscal rules 
Durability of the adjustment  Structural consolidation versus temporary and one-offs  
P
U
LL
 F
A
C
TO
R
S
 
C
om
m
itm
en
t  
Political factors  Elections, as dummy variable 
Source: Authors’ classification based on European Commission (2007), and the references quoted 
therein.  
Although there is no consensus or theoretical model of reference5 on the 
determinants driving “successful” consolidations a central focus of the literature 
has been the fiscal factors. Most papers note the role of initial fiscal conditions, in 
particular the influence of high initial debt or large fiscal deficits (e.g. European 
Commission (2007); Devries, Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2011)). Also 
Guichard et al. (2007) conclude that fiscal consolidations tend to occur when large 
budget deficits threaten sustainability. This is reflected in the “pre-conditions” in 
Table 1. Under “commitment” we include the composition of the fiscal consolidation 
as its role has been strongly highlighted by the literature on past consolidations. In 
particular, there is a general preference for the expenditure-based adjustment over 
tax hikes. Von Hagen and Strauch (2001), for example, conclude that the ‘good 
quality’ of fiscal adjustments – i.e. the emphasis on expenditure reduction rather 
than tax increases – has an important effect on the persistence of consolidations. 
The literature appears to emphasise the effectiveness of reducing politically 
sensitive items such as government consumption (mainly government wages and 
employment), subsidies and social transfers (e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995, 
1997)). Heylen and Everaert (2000) confirmed these results with multivariate 
analysis, suggesting that, surprisingly, raising taxes on business proves also to be 
effective6. Another pull factor of fiscal consolidation typically covered by the 
                                                                                                         
5 As pointed by Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011), the empirical research in this field is mostly 
based on selecting a single regression and dependant on the decision of which factors are relevant 
(based on its associated t-ratio). 
6 However, Molnár (2012) after examining 20 different revenue and expenditure items finds that the 
composition of the consolidation does not seem to explain its length.  
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existing literature is the size and the speed of the fiscal adjustment. The general 
idea is that large and persistent fiscal adjustments contribute to success7 (e.g. 
Briotti (2004); Giavazzi and Pagano (1996)), which is linked to the credibility of 
governments in their consolidation strategies and expectations of future tax 
reductions. In relation to the speed, there is a preference for gradual 
consolidations, but more intense efforts (e.g. “cold showers”) seem to be more 
effective than longer consolidations at high and rising debt levels and in low growth 
scenarios (European Commission (2007), Barrios et al., 2010). Moreover, we also 
consider under the “commitment”, the possible role of fiscal governance factors as 
a framework for sustaining consolidation, as suggested by the literature8 (e.g. 
Briotti (2004), and Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel and Andre (2007)). Although not 
explicitly contemplated by the relevant literature, we also test the durability of the 
adjustment undertaken by governments: whether it is based on structural 
consolidation over temporary and one-off measures.9 Finally, we also include 
under “commitment” the potential explanatory effect of political factors, via 
elections, in line with the growing  literature – although the evidence is not 
conclusive (e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (1998), Larch and Turrini 
(2008)). 
Another stream of the literature relates to the importance of the prevailing 
macroeconomic factors. Where papers assess the role of initial macroeconomic 
conditions the broad conclusions are that governments are ‘pushed’ into fiscal 
consolidations, in particular referring to weak public finances, but also when the 
initial macroeconomic indicators suggest a crisis situation (Ahrend, Catte and 
Price, 2006). Moreover, von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002) 10, and Guichard et al. 
(2007) found that weak domestic economic pre-conditions also play a role in 
explaining the likelihood of starting “successful” fiscal consolidations. Once 
consolidation has started, there is also a need to analyse the wider 
macroeconomic factors that ‘allow’, or make room for adjustment. The leading 
indicator that seems to justify the role of the macroeconomic environment is output 
growth, and to a lesser extent monetary conditions, competitiveness and the 
international economic environment. In general, existing empirical findings tend to 
suggest that favourable economic growth (in terms of GDP or output gap) 
contributes to the success of consolidation strategies (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995), Ardagna (2004), Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011), Agnello et al. 
(2012)). The findings on monetary conditions are mixed: while the monetary stance 
could positively contribute by accommodating consolidation (e.g. Ardagna (2004)), 
other authors found no evidence (e.g. von Hagen and Strauch (2001)). The role of 
competitiveness through exchange rate policy is not conclusive either, but 
evidence tends to suggest a positive effect of exchange rate depreciation on the 
success of consolidations (e.g. Molnár, 2012). Alesina and Perotti (1997) found 
that floating exchange rates better support successful consolidations than fixed 
                                                                                                         
7 However, the results are not consistent across existing studies, also due to the different definitions of 
success. For instance, Heylen and Evaraert (2000) find only a weak evidence to support the view of the 
importance of the size of fiscal adjustment.  
8 However, some studies do not find a significant impact of the expenditure rules (European 
Commission, 2007) or on the budget deficit rules (Barrios et al. 2010) on their sustaining role in 
successful fiscal consolidations.  
9 One-offs are temporary or non-recurrent fiscal operations that may substantially impact the 
government cyclically adjusted primary balance positively or negatively, e.g. capital revenues as result 
of pension transfers from the private sector to the social security system; sales of mobile phone 
licences; debt assumptions and debt cancellations; or tax amnesties (Joumard et al. 2008).    
10 Von Hagen and co-authors observe that initial conditions (in terms of output gap) were less 
favourable for “successful” consolidations than for “unsuccessful” ones. However, they also find that a) 
positive large output gaps increases the likelihood of starting fiscal consolidations, although they reduce 
the chances of success, and b) that fiscal consolidation is likely to start when the domestic economy is 
doing well compared to other economies.  
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exchange rates as currency devaluations increase the likelihood of success. 
Heylen and Everaert (2000) suggest that currency devaluations prior to 
consolidation episodes may be beneficial to their success, but only under the right 
composition of fiscal adjustment – otherwise it is counterproductive. Also a 
favourable international economic environment (high economic growth) has 
generally been assessed as sustaining fiscal consolidations (Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) and Heylen and Everaert (2000)). There is a lack of empirical evidence, to 
the best of our knowledge, on the impact of private sector balance sheets and 
wider financial conditions in sustaining consolidations. For some euro area 
members, with on-going private sector balance-sheet adjustment and financial 
sector restructuring, weak growth prospects and large current account deficits, the 
ability to change course – and not simply the government’s willingness to make the 
adjustment – will matter. The literature suggests that consolidations are more 
difficult after financial crises and depend crucially on the resolution of problems in 
the banking sector (Baldacci, Gupta and Mulas-Granados (2010); and Barrios et al. 
(2010)). In identifying financial factors, we follow the IMF (2008 and 2009), which 
identified fifteen recessions that were associated with (i.e. followed) financial 
crises. In doing so they relied on the narrative analysis of Reinhart and Rogoff in a 
series of recent papers (2008, 2009) describing banking crises over the past four 
decades. That analysis built on work identifying banking crisis episodes from the 
World Bank – see Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven and Noguera (2003).  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 3 outlines a definition of consolidation 
episodes and presents some stylised facts. Section 4 describes the analysis 
method, and Section 5 presents estimates of survival functions for consolidation 
episodes. Section 6 elaborates on the robustness of the results. Section 7 
illustrates an example of the role of push and pull factors in selected euro area 
countries. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
A definition of consolidation episodes and some initial 
stylized facts  
To start the analysis we need to define a sample of consolidation episodes and 
their duration. The literature takes two approaches. One angle is to measure fiscal 
consolidations based on reductions of the general government debt-to-GDP ratios 
accomplished during the consolidation period. In those studies, the duration of a 
consolidation episode is set by the period of time required to reduce debt by a 
given amount. The second approach, which we take here, is to assess 
consolidation periods according to changes in the government deficit, with most 
papers choosing to look at developments in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget 
balance (CAPB) which excludes the influence of interest rate developments and 
the cyclical fluctuations in economic activity on the government deficit. The 
duration of a consolidation period depends broadly on the length of period in which 
the government deficit (measured by CAPB) improves. While the use of the CAPB 
indicator is fairly common in the literature, it is subject to some criticism regarding 
its limitations to capture the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidations 
(Devries et al., 2011). 
While a number of studies use the CAPB approach to defining consolidations, each 
study tends to set different thresholds for what constitutes the start of a 
consolidation and what represents an ongoing improvement. Perhaps the simplest 
definition, used by Maroto Illera and Mulas-Granados (2008) and von Hagen et al. 
(2002), is for the duration of the consolidation episode to represent the number of 
years in which the CAPB improves. One criticism of that approach, however, is that 
it captures a lot of short, small changes in the government fiscal stance, which 
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might not be seen as periods of active consolidation.11 Thus others (e.g. Guichard 
et al. (2007)) use a stricter definition of the beginning of a consolidation period, 
requiring a substantial initial consolidation effort (e.g. around 1% or 1.5% over two 
years). Other authors define larger changes in CAPB to qualify for fiscal 
consolidation episode (e.g. two percentage points of GDP in one year by Alesina 
and Ardagna (1998)) or more refined definitions of changes in the CAPB (e.g. 
Afonso (2010) uses changes in CAPB at least 1.5 times the panel’s standard 
deviation in one year, or when the change in the CAPB is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years).   
We broadly follow the OECD approach (Guichard et al., 2007) by defining a 
consolidation period as: starting if the CAPB improves by at least one percentage 
point of GDP in one year or at least one half percentage point in two consecutive 
years; and continuing as long as the CAPB improves (although an interruption is 
allowed without terminating the episode as long as the deterioration of the CAPB is 
small – less than 0.3% of GDP – and is more than offset the following year). 
However, we add two features to this definition. First, we rule out any consolidation 
episodes that lasted only one year – we aim to assess the factors affecting periods 
of sustained improvements in the CAPB and are not interested in short-lived 
consolidation efforts. Second, we judge that a small decline in an already better 
fiscal position should not represent an interruption, as a sizeable primary surplus is 
likely to help a country reduce its government debt. Thus for instances during a 
consolidation period in which countries have reached a sizeable positive CAPB – 
defined here as 3% of GDP – we ignore any deteriorations in the CAPB that did not 
move the deficit below that threshold. Inevitably, the initial decision on what 
constitutes a consolidation episode sets the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
Section 5, therefore, analyses the implications of changing our definition of 
consolidation episodes.  
Before proceeding, however, it is worth noting that changes in the CAPB are just 
one way of viewing a consolidation effort. In particular, the fiscal literature tends to 
distinguish between consolidations that are based on structural, permanent 
measures and those that arise from reliance on temporary or special factors. The 
importance of those effects is discussed by Joumard, Minegishi, André, Nicq and 
Price (2008) with a comprehensive overview on the nature and amount of one-off 
operations and their role in undermining the accuracy of CAPBs.  
                                                                                                         
11 Based on that definition, von Hagen et al. (2002), for example, find 122 consolidation episodes from a 
sample of OECD countries between 1960 and 1998. Illera and Mulas-Granados (2007) find 277 
episodes of consolidation for EU countries between 1960 and 2004. 
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Figure 1: The duration of fiscal consolidations (number of consolidations lasting for 
x years) 
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Source: OECD and author calculations. 
Our study is based on an annual dataset covering 20 advanced economies over 
the period from 1970 to 2010, namely 14 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the U.K.), and 6 non-EU countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, and the U.S.). Based on our criteria and using this panel we 
find 65 complete episodes of consolidation as shown in Table 2. Past experience 
suggests consolidations have been short: nearly half of the episodes in the sample 
last only two years and most are over after four years. Only a few well-known 
cases lasted much longer: Denmark (1983-1991), Belgium (1993-2005), Ireland 
(1986-2001) and Japan (1979-1990).12 Overall, the average duration of fiscal 
adjustment in our study is just under four years, which contrasts with the findings of 
other approaches (for instance, two years by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996)).  
                                                                                                         
12 The dates for these countries are the result of using the definition described above. Alternative 
definitions, of course, would yield somewhat different dates for the consolidation episodes. 
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Table 2: Dates of consolidation episodes 
Country Start End Country Start End
Australia 1979 1981 Ireland 1986 2001
Australia 1986 1989 Ireland 2003 2007
Australia 1995 1999 Italy 1976 1978
Australia 2002 2004 Italy 1982 1984
Austria 1996 1998 Italy 1990 1994
Belgium 1974 1976 Italy 1995 2001
Belgium 1984 1988 Japan 1979 1990
Belgium 1993 2005 Netherlands 1972 1974
Belgium 2006 2008 Netherlands 1976 1978
Canada 1986 1990 Netherlands 1982 1986
Canada 1994 2002 Netherlands 2004 2006
Denmark 1983 1991 New Zealand 1991 1996
Denmark 1999 2001 New Zealand 2002 2004
Denmark 2004 2008 Portugal 1982 1985
Finland 1981 1983 Portugal 2002 2004
Finland 1984 1987 Portugal 2006 2008
Finland 1988 1990 Spain 1986 1988
Finland 1996 2004 Spain 1994 1998
France 1979 1981 Spain 2005 2007
France 1983 1985 Sweden 1975 1977
France 1994 2000 Sweden 1983 1985
Germany 1976 1978 Sweden 1986 1989
Germany 1981 1986 Sweden 1994 1999
Germany 1992 1995 Sweden 2004 2006
Germany 1996 2000 Switzerland 1994 1997
Germany 2005 2008 Switzerland 2005 2009
Greece 1979 1981 United Kingdom 1979 1983
Greece 1982 1984 United Kingdom 1994 2001
Greece 1986 1988 United States 1976 1980
Greece 1990 1995 United States 1987 1990
Greece 1998 2001 United States 1993 1999
Greece 2005 2007 United States 2005 2007
Ireland 1982 1985  
Note: OECD Economic Outlook database, variable code NLGXQA. Note that there are a further 10 
episodes that begin in 2010 which have not been concluded and are excluded from our analysis. 
Duration analyses  
In the subsequent analysis, we study the factors that appear to have affected the 
length of expansions in our sample of advanced economies, using estimates of 
hazard functions (e.g. Maroto Illera and Mulas-Granados, 2008). Duration analysis 
provides estimates of the probabilities of a consolidation coming to an end after a 
certain length of time. We estimate hazard functions for the duration of 
consolidations in the sample of advanced economies, where the duration 
represents the number of years of uninterrupted fiscal consolidation (according to 
the definition above). The hazard function measures the conditional rate at which a 
consolidation will come to an end. Relative to other models such as those that 
focus on the probability of an event taking place (e.g. a probit or logit model), the 
focus of duration analysis is somewhat different. The central concept in duration 
analysis is not the unconditional probability of an event but its conditional 
probability (e.g. the probability of a consolidation ending in a given year given that 
the expansion has lasted up to that point).  
We define the length of a consolidation (T), measuring the number of years from 
the start to the end, as a random variable with a cumulative distribution function 
F(t) and probability density function f(t). The survivor function is S(t) = 1 – F(t), 
which gives the probability that the duration of a consolidation is greater than or 
equal to t. The hazard function h(t) = f(t) / S(t) measures the rate at which 
consolidation spells will be completed at duration t – i.e. the probability of a budget 
surplus or deficit deteriorating at time t, conditional on the consolidation having 
lasted until that moment. 
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches in the literature to estimating the 
hazard function. One is to use a non-parametric or semi-parametric approach, 
most commonly associated with the Cox proportional hazards model. Although the 
nonparametric approach is more flexible, it can lead to less precise estimates of 
the hazard function than a correctly specified parametric form. The other approach, 
and the one taken here, is to specify and estimate a functional form for the hazard 
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function. Various forms are possible, but a common approach – and the one used 
here – is the Weibull model: 
  h(t,X) 
1 t exp )'( X    
where exp(.) is the exponential function and X is a vector of covariates which 
influence the hazard rate. The hazard rate (the conditional rate at which 
consolidations end) either rises with time ( >1) – which is termed “positive 
duration dependence”, falls with time ( <1) or is constant. This suggests that the 
conditional probability of a consolidation ending increases as time passes, either 
as ‘consolidation fatigue’ sets in, or perhaps because as a consolidation continues, 
policymakers conclude that the ‘job is done’ – governments have pushed through 
sufficient consolidation to put finances on a sustainable path.  
In the following sections we present parametric estimates, with hazard functions 
using the Weibull model. To check the robustness of the results, we also 
considered other functional forms and the non-parametric approach of the Cox 
proportional hazards model. In order to discriminate between models, the literature 
suggests a graphical analysis of the so-called Cox-Snell residuals (e.g. Arjas, 
1988). That analysis suggested that, indeed, the Weibull model presents a 
relatively good fit for our estimated model. Another key issue is how to handle the 
possible presence of country level heterogeneity. Various approaches exist. One is 
to assume that countries have differing propensities for sustaining consolidations. 
These propensities – or frailties – are analogous to random effects in panel data 
models. An alternative is to include fixed effects or country dummies in the set of 
covariates. As an initial step in our estimations, we tested for the significance of 
fixed and random effects. However, in both instances we found the effects to be 
insignificant.   
Parametric analyses: factors sustaining the length of 
fiscal consolidations  
Tables 4 to 7 present estimations of hazard models for the duration of 
consolidation periods for our panel of advanced economies, using the Weibull 
model. The variables included in the models are described in Table 3. The 
coefficients are reported as hazard ratios – a coefficient greater than zero indicates 
that an increase in the explanatory variable increases the hazard rate (the 
conditional probability of a consolidation coming to an end). We also report a 
measure of explained variation, an adjusted R-squared employed for survival 
models (Royston (2006)).  
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Table 3: Definitions of variables used in duration analyses 
Variable Definition 
CAPB Government cyclically adjusted primary balance (OECD definition) 
Government debt Gross government debt as percent GDP 
Government debt >90% Dummy variable indicating government debt-to-GDP ratio grater than 90% 
Govt. interest payments (% GDP) Gross government interest payments as percent GDP (expressed as negative number) 
Real long-term interest rates Yields on 10 year government bonds deflated by current CPI year-on-year growth 
Real short-term interest rates Yields on short-term government bonds deflated by current CPI year-on-year growth 
Real GDP growth rate Annual GDP growth in three years prior to consolidation 
Real potential output growth rate Potential output growth (OECD estimate) 
Output gap Output as percent of potential (OECD estimate) 
World GDP growth Annual growth in World GDP (IMF) 
Current account balance Current account balance as percent of GDP 
Private sector net lending Private sector surplus / deficit as percent of GDP 
Private sector credit-to-GDP Private sector credit to GDP ratio (source: BIS) 
Private sector credit growth Change in private sector credit-to-GDP ratio in three years prior to consolidation 
Real equity price growth Annual growth in equity prices (deflated by CPI) in three years prior to consolidation 
Financial crisis  Dummy for occurrence of financial crisis in three years prior to consolidation (source Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)). 
Real effective exchange rate Real effective exchange rate deflated by CPI 
Inflation Annual CPI inflation in three years prior to consolidation 
Share of consolidation - 
expenditure 
Expenditure adjustment: share of deficit change during 
consolidation episode 
Share of consolidation - revenue Revenue adjustment: share of deficit change during consolidation episode 
Share of consolidation - 
temporary measures 
Share of deficit change during consolidation episode accounted for 
by one-off measures (OECD definition) 
Intensity of consolidation Average change in government deficit during consolidation episode (above minimum set by consolidation definition) 
Frontloading (consolidation in first 
two years) Deficit change in first two years of consolidation 
Change in government debt over 
consolidation Percentage point change in debt-to-GDP ratio during consolidation 
Track record of consolidation Number of years of consolidation in five years prior to consolidation episode 
Fiscal rules Fiscal rules strength index (source: European Commission) 
Source: OECD databases (unless otherwise stated). 
Table 4 investigates the role of initial fiscal and financial conditions. We start by 
estimating the model without any covariates (column 1) and the results suggest 
positive duration dependence: the estimates of alpha are greater than one. Indeed, 
throughout the various specifications that remains the case. That means that in 
general, in our sample, consolidations are more likely to end as they become older. 
The next set of variables analyse the initial conditions before fiscal consolidations 
got underway. As far as possible, we would like to isolate factors driving the 
duration of consolidations. We therefore focus the analysis on variables in the year 
before the consolidation began, rather than the first year of consolidation when the 
impact of changes to the fiscal deficit will already be apparent. This should help 
ensure that the variables are exogenous – drivers of the consolidation length rather 
than reflections of ongoing consolidation – although we cannot control for possible 
expectation effects that might have arisen from the anticipation of planned 
consolidation efforts.  
We find a strong role for the government’s starting position: a larger deficit tends to 
presage a longer consolidation (column 2). High government debt also matters but 
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is no longer statistically significant when instead we also include the government 
interest burden (column 3). Interestingly, we found no role for non-linearities: for 
example, we found no statistical evidence that government debt above a 90% (a 
threshold identified Reinhart and Rogoff (2012)) affected the length of 
consolidations. Nonetheless, market pressures would appear to play a role: higher 
long-term real bond yields also push governments to sustain consolidations for 
longer (columns 6 and 7).  
Table 4: Determinants of duration of consolidations – the role of initial conditions 
(estimates of hazard function using Weibull model, coefficients shown as hazard 
ratios) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Duration of the episode 0.517*** 0.676*** 0.703*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.765*** 0.759***
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.104* 0.116* 0.094 0.094 0.108** 0.110*
Government debt -0.021*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Government interest burden 0.197*** 0.200** 0.201*** 0.126*** 0.122***
High government debt (>90%) 0.151 0.150
Government debt (60% to 90%) -0.004
Real long-term interest rates -0.181*** -0.163***
Real short-term interest rates -0.020
Constant -2.441*** -1.380*** -1.646*** -1.758*** -1.757*** -1.729*** -1.726***
Number observations 253 248 248 248 248 242 240
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Number of consolidations 65 63 63 63 63 61 60
Adjusted-R-squared 0.149 0.177 0.172 0.163 0.265 0.247
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level respectively. Each variable is 
measured in the year before the consolidation begins. The “duration of the episode” reports the value of 
the Weibull parameter that governs the shape of the hazard function. The coefficients are reported as 
hazard ratios – a coefficient greater than zero indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable 
increases the hazard rate (the conditional probability of a consolidation coming to an end). We also 
report a measure of explained variation, an adjusted R-squared employed for survival models (Royston 
(2006)). 
In Table 5 we turn to investigating the role of initial macroeconomic conditions. We 
retain the significant ‘push’ factors from Table 1 – the CAPB, government interest 
burden and long-term bond yields – and add other macro variables. We find that a 
larger initial current account surplus or higher private sector surplus tends to help 
sustain consolidations (columns 2 and 3), even once we have accounted for the 
role of the government deficit. Higher private sector saving (as a percent of GDP) 
also appears to reduce the probability of consolidations ending (column 4). There 
is more mixed evidence on the role of financial conditions. A high stock of private 
sector debt is not a significant explanatory factor but strong credit growth in the 
period before the consolidation does appear to affect the likelihood of a sustained 
consolidation (columns 5 and 6). Perhaps because strong credit growth may 
subsequently require retrenchment from the private non-financial and financial 
sectors, we find that higher private sector credit growth in the years prior to the 
consolidation tends to reduce the duration of the consolidation. A similar role for 
boom-bust dynamics may explain why strong growth in equity prices in the years 
before a consolidation episode also tends to reduce the duration (column 7). That 
finding might reflect the suggestion from Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2012) that in a 
post-boom phase  countries become highly politically polarized following financial 
crises, and as a result, sustained consolidation efforts are more difficult. We do not 
find the dummy for financial crises to be significant (column 8), which might be 
explained by two factors. First, the impact of the financial crisis on the duration of 
subsequent consolidation efforts may simply be seen most through the deleterious 
effect on the fiscal position which then push governments towards consolidation. 
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Second, it may be that following a financial crisis, the state of private sector 
balance sheets (captured in other variables in our model) is a more important 
determinant of how effectively governments can tackle the subsequent need for 
retrenchment.  
Table 5: Determinants of duration of consolidations – the role of macroeconomic 
conditions (estimates of hazard function using Weibull model, coefficients shown 
as hazard ratios) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Duration of the episode 0.765*** 0.832*** 0.831*** 0.856*** 0.770*** 0.780*** 0.768*** 0.759***
CAPB 0.108** 0.164*** 0.080* 0.080** 0.117** 0.073 0.096* 0.107**
Government interest burden 0.126*** 0.175*** 0.092 0.126** 0.156*** 0.127** 0.113** 0.126***
Real long-term interest rates -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.222*** -0.173*** -0.168*** -0.230*** -0.187***
Current account balance -0.081***
Private sector net lending -0.081***
Private saving ratio -0.080*
Credit to GDP ratio -0.005
Change in credit to GDP ratio 0.063*
Real equity price growth 0.020*
Financial crisis 0.324
Constant -1.729*** -1.742*** -1.827*** -0.239 -1.254*** -1.956*** -1.789*** -1.717***
Number observations 242 228 228 232 234 232 237 232
Number of countries 20 19 19 20 19 19 20 20
Number of consolidations 61 57 57 57 58 57 59 61
Adjusted-R-squared 0.265 0.296 0.302 0.321 0.275 0.275 0.272 0.252
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Duration of the episode 0.794*** 0.774*** 0.761*** 0.807*** 0.886*** 0.765*** 0.802*** 0.759***
CAPB 0.100** 0.091* 0.101* 0.065 0.076* 0.113** 0.155*** 0.110*
Government interest burden 0.146*** 0.128*** 0.125** 0.104* 0.220*** 0.125*** 0.178*** 0.122***
Real long-term interest rates -0.187*** -0.162*** -0.170*** -0.191*** -0.155*** -0.181*** -0.108** -0.163***
GDP growth -0.101
World GDP growth 0.363
Output gap 0.061
Real exchange rate 0.026**
Relative ULC growth 0.201***
Openness -0.001
Inflation 0.084***
Monetary policy interest rate -0.020
Constant -1.488*** -3.155*** -1.713*** -4.500*** -1.770*** -1.683*** -2.253*** -1.726***
Number observations 240 232 242 232 228 242 240 240
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 20
Number of consolidations 60 61 61 58 56 61 60 60
Adjusted-R-squared 0.261 0.267 0.264 0.296 0.342 0.257 0.286 0.247
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level respectively. Each variable is 
measured in the year before the consolidation begins. The “duration of the episode” reports the value of 
the Weibull parameter that governs the shape of the hazard function. The coefficients are reported as 
hazard ratios – a coefficient greater than zero indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable 
increases the hazard rate (the conditional probability of a consolidation coming to an end). The measure 
of explained variation is an adjusted R-squared employed for survival models (Royston (2006)). 
We tested a number of other variables. The role of growth dynamics is unclear: a 
higher real GDP growth rate tends to increase the probability of a consolidation 
continuing but a larger output gap lowers the probability of a sustained 
consolidation. Moreover, none of the coefficients are statistically significant 
(columns 9 and 10). In combination with other variables we find that stronger real 
GDP growth at the onset of a consolidation period is typically associated with a 
longer-lasting consolidation effort.  The international environment – proxied by 
world real GDP growth – played no significant role. The important role for 
competitiveness is confirmed: a more competitive real exchange rate and smaller 
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increases in unit labour costs (relative to other advanced economies) in the lead-up 
to a consolidation tend to increase the likelihood that the consolidation will last 
(columns 12 and 13). We find no additional explanatory power from the openness 
of an economy, measured as the ratio of exports to GDP (column 14). Moreover, 
stronger inflation in the years preceding the start of consolidation tends to reduce 
the length of subsequent consolidations (column 15). But, the coefficient on the 
monetary policy interest rate is insignificant (column 16). This is line with the 
literature, which does not find a uniformly significant role for monetary policy in 
affecting the length of consolidation periods.  
Table 6: Determinants of duration of consolidations – fiscal policy and the fiscal 
framework (estimates of hazard function using Weibull model, coefficients shown 
as hazard ratios) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Duration of the episode 0.765*** 0.832*** 0.831*** 0.856*** 0.770*** 0.780*** 0.768*** 0.794*** 0.772*** 0.761***
CAPB 0.074 0.074 0.111 0.011 0.070 0.367*** 0.126 0.074 0.068 -0.008
Government interest burden 0.242*** 0.267*** 0.288*** 0.297*** 0.246*** 0.304*** 0.277*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.116
Real long-term interest rates -0.115* -0.109 -0.122* -0.149* -0.118* -0.149** -0.119* -0.128* -0.117* -0.683***
Current account balance -0.080** -0.084** -0.088** -0.008 -0.079** -0.066* -0.088** -0.081** -0.081** -0.069
Change in credit to GDP ratio 0.087** 0.102*** 0.095** 0.102** 0.086** 0.093*** 0.059 0.091** 0.087** 0.087
Real exchange rate 0.037* 0.043** 0.046** 0.020 0.036* 0.028 0.031 0.035* 0.036* 0.122***
GDP growth -0.221* -0.228** -0.209* -0.058 -0.224* -0.212* -0.211* -0.263** -0.221* 0.002
Inflation 0.104** 0.116** 0.125** 0.146*** 0.105** 0.111** 0.100** 0.087 0.100* 0.209
Consolidation composition:
    Expenditure share 0.001
    Revenue share -0.003
    Temporary measures share 0.012**
Track record in consolidation 0.032
Intensity of consolidation 2.461***
Frontloading 0.150
Change in debt 0.024
Election 0.172
Fiscal rules 0.411*
Constant -6.055*** -6.585*** -6.694*** -5.234** -6.049*** -5.689*** -5.462** -5.634** -6.052*** -16.100***
Number observations 210 200 200 173 210 200 210 195 210 96
Number of countries 19 19 19 18 19 19 19 19 19 13
Number of consolidations 51 51 51 44 51 51 51 49 51 22
Adjusted-R-squared 0.394 0.393 0.404 0.472 0.385 0.476 0.395 0.384 0.387 0.627
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level, respectively. Each variable is 
measured in the year before the consolidation begins. The “duration of the episode” reports the value of 
the Weibull parameter that governs the shape of the hazard function. The coefficients are reported as 
hazard ratios – a coefficient greater than zero indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable 
increases the hazard rate (the conditional probability of a consolidation coming to an end). We also 
report a measure of explained variation, an adjusted R-squared employed for survival models (Royston 
(2006)). 
Having analysed the macroeconomic backdrop to consolidation episodes, we turn 
to the role of fiscal policy choices. Table 6 presents the estimations for duration of 
consolidation, again using the Weibull model. We retain the set of initial conditions 
that proved to be significant and add different indicators of fiscal policy, including 
indicators of the composition of adjustment, the temporality of the adjustment, the 
size and pace of consolidation and the strength of the governance framework. A 
key finding in the literature is that the composition of consolidation – the split 
between expenditure and revenue measures – is important (e.g. Maroto Illera and 
Mulas-Granados (2008), von Hagen et al. (2002)). In columns two and three we 
add variables that indicate the proportion of deficit reduction during the 
consolidation phase accounted for by changes in current expenditure, and current 
revenue. In contrast to several studies in the literature, we find the coefficients on 
the composition variables to be insignificant. Once we have accounted for the role 
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of initial macroeconomic conditions, the composition of the fiscal adjustment – the 
split between revenue and expenditure measures – does not appear to be a 
significant determinant of the duration of consolidation.13 But the dimension that 
does appear to play a role is the durability of the adjustment. Our evidence 
suggests that consolidations lasted longer when one-off measures played a 
smaller role (column 4). One explanation is that the key to successful consolidation 
efforts is linked to the commitment of the government in approaching the task, 
seeking for a permanent rather than a temporary change to the fiscal position.14 
The results for other features of fiscal policy choices are generally in line with the 
literature. We find that the intensity of deficit reduction – the average pace of 
improvement in the CAPB over the consolidation episode – is significant. Longer-
lasting consolidation episodes were based on rather gradual improvements in 
government deficit positions. However, we find no evidence that the amount of 
frontloading of the consolidation effort is a signal of greater willingness or ability to 
sustain consolidation efforts for longer. Neither do we find a significant role for a 
country’s track record of consolidation. Elections do not appear to signal the end of 
a consolidation episode.  
Examining the robustness of the results  
To assess the robustness of the results we checked variations to the definition of 
consolidation: first, we included in the sample consolidation periods lasting only 
one year; second we specified a higher starting hurdle – i.e. a greater initial change 
in the fiscal position (of at least 1.5% in the first two years); third we allowed for 
more gradual deficit reductions to qualify, with a lower initial threshold (only 0.5% 
over the first two years). These alternative definitions yielded respectively 101, 76 
and 52 consolidation episodes. In general, in neither case did we see large 
changes to our findings. Most variables that were significant using our main 
definition were also significant under these alternative specifications.  In particular, 
we still find a strong role for the starting fiscal position: the initial deficit, interest 
burden and long-term real bond yields. Most macro conditions also remained 
significant. In particular, the external position and competitiveness remained 
important indicators of sustainable consolidation. Two exceptions, however, were 
in the roles of growth and inflation in the run up to consolidation, which were less 
consistently significant predictors of the duration of consolidations using these 
alternative definitions. Finally, we also investigate whether adjustments to our 
sample affected the results. One concern might be that the outliers – in particular 
the three long consolidations in Belgium, Ireland and Japan – have affected the 
results. However, rerunning the estimations excluding these observations, we 
found the results to be very similar. 
                                                                                                         
13 To check this finding, we also used a more detailed breakdown of government revenue and spending, 
separating the proportion of deficit reduction in each consolidation episode by types of expenditure and 
revenue. Following von Hagen et al. (2002) we added to each equation a variable showing the 
contribution of a particular budget item to the total deficit reduction achieved during the consolidation 
episode. All but one coefficient (that on capital expenditure) is statistically insignificant suggesting that 
there is overall not strong support for the view that the composition of deficit reductions is an important 
determinant of the length of consolidation periods. We also investigated different definitions for the fiscal 
composition – e.g. using a dummy variable to define whether the adjustment was predominantly 
expenditure- or revenue-based etc. In none of the cases were the variables statistically significant. 
14 However, the role of the fiscal rules could not be demonstrated, as the analysis (column 10) shows a 
curious result that stronger fiscal rules appear to increase the likelihood of a consolidation episode 
ending.  Moreover, with the series for the fiscal rules strength index available only for EU countries from 
1990 onwards, the sample of consolidation episodes is considerably smaller, and therefore the results 
are limited. 
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The role of push factors and pull factors in euro area 
countries  
To illustrate the insights from our work, we use our results to illustrate some of the 
challenges that lie ahead for some euro area countries that have embarked on a 
consolidation path during 2010-11. While, for several Member States the push 
factors are obvious, with high public debt levels, large deficits, high sovereign bond 
yields and rising interest burdens forcing governments to take strong action 
towards fiscal austerity, there are clear challenges too. This is particularly true for 
those countries suffering from twin deficits of large fiscal and current account 
imbalances and cumulated competitiveness problems. In this sense, Figure 2 
shows survivor curves for the duration of the current fiscal consolidation efforts in 
countries under EU/IMF economic and financial programmes (Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal) as well as Spain and Italy. Figure 3 shows a decomposition of the factors 
affecting the estimated probability of a duration lasting at least five years. The 
probability estimates are based on the equation which includes the initial fiscal 
conditions – deficit, bond yields and interest payments – and macroeconomic 
capacity – current account, real effective exchange rate, recent credit 
developments and growth and inflation dynamics. To provide a common overview, 
the estimated starting point is 2010. The estimated probabilities that these 
countries will be able to maintain a sustained consolidation effort are generally 
quite low. That should not be a surprise: the estimates are derived from analysis of 
past experiences and previous examples of long-lasting consolidation are relatively 
rare, as Figure 1 highlighted. For example, from our sample, the unconditional 
probability of consolidation lasting longer than five years is under a half.  
Figure 2: Estimated survivor curves for 
current fiscal consolidation efforts in 
selected euro area countries 
(probability of consolidation lasting to 
particular year) 
0.0
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Notes: survivor functions estimated using Weibull 
distribution assumption for baseline hazard (see 
Table 6, column 1). The “average experience” 
shows the average estimated probability 
assuming all explanatory variables are at their 
mean. Other curves show estimates of the 
probabilities for Ireland, Greece and Portugal 
based on current developments. 
Figure 3: Factors affecting current 
probabilities of achieving long-lasting 
consolidation in selected euro area 
countries (contribution to estimated 
probability of consolidations starting in 
2010  lasting five years or more) 
-0.5
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Ireland Portugal Greece Spain Italy
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Long-term real int. Current account balance
Real exchange rate GDP growth
Inflation
Prob> five years
 
Notes: survivor functions estimated using Weibull 
distribution assumption for baseline hazard (see 
Table 6, column 1). The “average experience” 
shows the average estimated probability 
assuming all explanatory variables are at their 
mean. The other contributions show the effect of 
each variable relative to the mean experience. 
However, there are interesting differences in the estimated probabilities for each 
country which highlight the potential varied pressures in each situation. For 
instance, according to the estimates, Ireland appears considerably more likely to 
maintain fiscal consolidation than the other countries from the sample. Some of the 
drivers for Ireland are the ‘push’ factors that make consolidation a necessity, such 
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as the high primary deficit, relatively heavy interest burden and high long-term real 
bond yields. Yet the recent improvement in Ireland’s competitive position, with 
relatively low inflation and unit labour cost growth, as well as the return towards 
current account balance, could also be expected to help Ireland’s consolidation 
effort. These rebalancing efforts in the Irish economy are further supported by the 
return to the capital markets during 2012.  
By contrast, Greece suffers from continued poor competitiveness (a high real 
exchange rate and continued high unit labour cost growth) which, combined with a 
large current account surplus, underscores the apparent difficulty for the 
government to achieve lasting fiscal consolidation. The relatively low likelihood 
shown for Greece in Figure 2 was confirmed by the need to restructure its 
government debt in Spring 2012. Portugal’s problems are also related to lack of 
competitiveness and continued high current account deficit. Another finding is that 
countries with less dominant ‘push’ factors (lower interest payments like Spain or 
stronger CAPB position like Italy) show also a relatively lower probability of 
sustaining long consolidations.  
As discussed above, one needs to recall that this analysis uses as the starting 
point the situation in 2010.15 Developments during 2011 would perhaps have 
heightened concerns that these countries also needed to implement consolidation 
in the coming years. Moreover, the estimates omit some important elements to the 
current efforts, such as the role of the institutional framework of the EU/IMF 
programmes in sustaining consolidations.16  
Conclusions   
This article has presented analysis of the factors affecting the duration of past 
consolidations in advanced economies. Our analysis suggests that the starting 
point matters – the fiscal and macroeconomic conditions appear to influence the 
success of governments in sustaining lengthy consolidations. In line with the 
literature, we find that governments often appear to have been ‘pushed’ towards 
sustained fiscal consolidations – the duration of consolidation is driven by the need 
to adjust course: longer consolidations occur when public debt is high, fiscal 
deficits are large, the interest burden heavy and long-term bond yields elevated. 
Our contribution to the literature is to put considerably more emphasis on the 
macroeconomic backdrop to consolidation episodes. We find that other factors, 
what we call pull factors, affect the duration of consolidations: a countries’ capacity 
to change course or its room for manoeuvre is important. Higher initial private 
sector savings and a stronger external balance appear to help governments 
sustain longer-lasting consolidations. The important role for competitiveness is 
underlined: a more competitive real exchange rate in the lead-up to a consolidation 
tends to increase the likelihood of a sustained fiscal adjustment. Finally, in contrast 
to some studies in the literature, we also find that there is less prominence for 
factors that might indicate a government’s willingness or resolve in its approach to 
consolidation. In particular, once we have accounted for the role macroeconomic 
conditions, the composition of the fiscal adjustment – the split between expenditure 
and revenue measures – does not appear to be a significant determinant of the 
duration of consolidation. However, commitment to permanent, rather than 
temporary, fiscal adjustment is key.  
                                                                                                         
15 The regression estimates use the situation in the year before consolidation began. In this framework, 
for an assessment of the consolidation prospects from 2011 onwards, it is therefore the situation in 
2010 that affects the length of consolidation. 
16 See, for example, Gupta et al. (2004) who analyse a wide dataset for countries with IMF-supported 
programmes in the 1990s. 
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